original found at:



HOWARD KOLLITZ (State Bar No. 059611),                             FILED
RICHARD D. BURSTEIN (State Bar No. 056661),
KIM TUNG (State Bar No. 196236)                                    02 DEC 4 PM12:27
JAMES B. DEVINE (State Bar No. 205270)                             unintelligible TAX COURT
GREGORY M. SHAMO (State Bar No. 217656) of                         Central District of California
2029 Century Park East, Third Floor                                BY___[initials]____DEPUTY
Los Angeles, California 90067-2904
Telephone:   (310) 277-0077
Facsimile:   (310) 277-5735

Attorneys for Defendants
Peter Henman-Laufer and Milova

                                     UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
                                     CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
                                           NORTHERN DIVISION

In re                                         ) Case No. ND-01-11549-RR
REED E. SLATKIN,                              ) Chapter 11
           Debtor.                            )
____________________________________________  )
R. TODD NEILSON, Trustee Of The               )  Adv. No. AD-02-01165-RR
Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Estate Of               )
Reed E. Slatkin,                              )  Judge: Hon. Robin L. Riblet
           Plaintiff,                         )  DEFENDANTS' EX PARTE
                                              )  APPLICATION FOR ORDER VACATING
     v.                                       )  HEARING DATE ON TRUSTEE'S
                                              )  MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY
a California corporation, and                 )  OF RICHARD D.  BURSTEIN AND
DOES 1-10                                     )  DECLARATION OF HOWARD KOLLITZ
                                              )  IN SUPPORT THEREOF
           Defendants.                        )
                                              )  Date:  January 17, 2003
                                              )  Time:  10:00 am
                                              )  Place: 1415 State Street
                                              )  Courtroom 201
                                              )  Santa Barbara,
______________________________________________)  California


200946.01 [XP] 23297



Defendants Peter Henman-Laufer and Milova Incorporated
("Defendants") apply to this Court by this ex parte application
under the authority of Local Bankruptcy Rule 9075-1 for an Order
vacating the hearing date on the Trustee's pending motion for
partial summary judgment.  Defendants cannot be compelled to
respond to the Trustee's motion at this time.  They have had no
opportunity to develop a record to present to the Court.  The
Trustee's counsel knows that.


                        STATEMENT OF CASE

On or about November 18, 2002, the Trustee filed his within
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment ("Motion") with supporting
documentation seeking a partial summary judgment that the Debtor
possessed "actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud" his
creditors, as set forth in page 2, lines 19 through 24 of the
Motion.  The Trustee has done so in this case, and in twenty other
cases, despite having advised counsel for various defendants by
fax letter on November 11, 2002 of his intent to do so and having
immediately received the responding demand of within counsel that
he not do so, that no discovery opportunity had been accorded to
the defendants to permit them to even begin to frame a response to
the Motion.  After an exchange of communications, Trustee's
counsel maintained his intent to proceed.

It is elementary due process and a requirement of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure
that adequate opportunity to conduct discovery to meet a summary
judgment motion be accorded to a defendant before a summary
judgment motion can be heard.  The Trustee's breathtaking
assertion in the Motion that the confession of the Debtor requires
this Court to determine this issue summarily against persons not
involved in the criminal case and without according them an
opportunity to probe the veracity of that plea and its
applicability to this case, or to offer evidence that a ponzi
scheme was not present here, is contrary to the basic due process and
not supported by the authorities cited by the Trustee.

This Court must grant this application, or set it on
immediate hearing, vacate the hearing date until such time as,
upon further direction of the Court, it is determined that the
matter may be set for hearing.





                  OPPORTUNITY TO OBTAIN IT

A. Review of the Trustee's Motion

The Trustee asserts that this Court must summarily resolve in
his favor and against the Defendants the issue of whether or not
Slatkin acted with actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud _his_
_creditors_ based on his plea that he acted with intent to defraud
_investors_, Motion at page 8, lines 1-4, and without the
Defendants' right to prove that plea or offer contrary evidence.

The mere fact that the Slatkin plea agreement may be
admissible in evidence, or at trial may be sufficient to support a
finding of fact on a contested issue of fact, does not mean that
it is dispositive of an issue of fact for purposes of summary
judgment.  Consequently, the Trustee's authority at page 8 of the
Motion is beside the point for purposes of this motion.  The cases
cited by the Trustee only demonstrate how important it is for a
court to consider guilty please.  _Boykin_v._Alabama_, 395 U.S. 238
(1969) (reversible error to convict defendant where record fails
to disclose that guilty plea of defendant was made knowingly and
voluntarily); _Seiling_v._Eyuman_, 148 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1973)
(guilty verdict reversed where state failed to prove that
defendant was competent to make voluntary and knowing guilty
plea); (3) _People_v._Jones_, 52 Cal.2d 636 (1959) (guilty plea
relieved prosecution of duty of presenting evidence that
defendants committed the crime).

Further, the cases cited at pages 9 and 10 of the Motion
merely establish that upon a contested trial, a conclusion of fact
may be based on the plea.  In _Emerson_v._Maples_ (In re Mark
Benskin & Co., Inc.), 161 B.R. 644, 649-50 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn.
1993), the bankruptcy court looked at the totality of the
evidence, including the debtor's guilty plea, in determining that
the debtor actually intended to defraud creditors when it
conducted a trial on the issue - not summary judgment.  In _Martino_
_v._Edison_Worldwide_Capital_(In_re_Randy)_, 159 B.R. 425, 440
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1995), the bankruptcy court explains at length
that the defendants in response to a summary judgment motion
failed to produce any evidence other than the bare denials that
triable issues of material fact existed to counter the debtor's
guilty plea.  Defendants here, by this motion, wish to avoid that

It is worth noting that the authority that the _In_re_Randy_
court relied upon involves the application of collateral estoppel
to parties in the criminal action.  See _Nathan_v._Tenna_Corp., 560
F.2d 761 (7th Cir. 1973) (plaintiff who pled guilty to fraud
stemming from illegal commission-sharing contract was collaterally
estopped from denying illegality of contract in subsequent civil
action to enforce contract); _Raiford_v._Abney_(Matter_of_Raiford)_,
695 F.2d 521 (11th Cir. 1983) (debtor convicted of bankruptcy fraud
in connection with filing fraudulent schedules was collaterally
estopped form denying his discharge on the grounds of fraud);
_Leibowitz_v._Saleh_(In_re_Discount_Merchandise,_Inc.)_ 1994 WL
18629 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1994) (defendant convicted of defrauding
creditors of bankrupt company by obtaining goods of the company
was collaterally estopped from denying that the transfers of the
debtor's property to him were fraudulent transfers).  None of
these cases supports the notion that on summary judgment in a
civil case persons other than the criminal case defendant can be
estopped by that defendant's guilty plea.  Finally the _In_re_Randy_
case has recently been questioned by the 11th Circuit in
_Orlick_v._Kozyak_(In_re_Financial_Federated_Title_&_Trust, Inc.),
2002 WL 31356650 (11th Cir. 2002.).

Recognizing that this is, after all, a ponzi scheme, the
Trustee then goes on to argue that the ponzi scheme establishes
actual intent and the Debtor's confession that he operated a ponzi
scheme confirms that intent, see page 10 to 11 of the Motion.  In
doing so, the Trustee demonstrates that frailty of his Motion.
That the Debtor may have lied, that he may not have operated a
pure ponzi scheme, may be shown both by cross-examination of him
and by independent expert testimony with regard to the books and
records of the Debtor.  None of that, of course, has been afforded
to the Defendants.

B. The Defendants have Had No Opportunity to Conduct Discovery

As is shown in the accompanying Declaration of Howard
Kollitz, the Defendants have had no discover opportunities.
Indeed, in states reports filed with this Court, the Trustee has
stated that the Debtor's deposition will not be available until
after the hearing date for this motion.  The Trustee did not until
November 19, 2002, make available the Trustee's "Document
Depository" to counsel for the Defendants for examination, see the
Declaration for Richard D. Burstein.

C. The Motion for Summary Judgment Must be Deferred for

While of course the Trustee relies on Federal Rule of
Bankruptcy Procedure 7056, which incorporates Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 56, FRCP 56(f) permits the Court to continue a
hearing in the event that discovery is necessary to oppose the
motion.  As shown herein, such discovery is necessary and this
Court must continue this hearing.  For this reason, the
Defendants' counsel requested that the Trustee not bring this
motion at this time, but were rebuffed.



For all of the reasons set forth herein, it is respectfully
requested that the within application be granted, the hearing on
the Motion be vacated, to be reset by further order of this Court.

Dated: December 2, 2002       DANNING, GILL, DIAMOND & KOLLITZ, LLP

                              By: (signed) [unintelligible]
                                  Richard D. Burstein
                                  Attorneys for Defendants,
                                  Peter Henman-Laufer and
                                  Milova Incorporated



I, Richard D. Burstein, declare:

1. I am the principal of a professional law corporation
which is a partner in the law firm of DANNING, GILL, DIAMOND &
KOLLITZ, LLP, attorneys of record for Defendants herein.  If
called upon to testify, I could so competently to the matters set
forth herein below.

2. On November 11, 2002, I received a letter from Alexander
Pilmer, Esq., advising of the Trustee's intent to file the within
motion.  On the same day, upon my receipt of the letter, by e-mail
I transmitted my request that he not do so.  He replied, rejecting
my request, and I replied further.  Attached hereto, designated as
Exhibits "A" and "B" are true and correct copies of Mr. Pilmer's
letter and the replying e-mails related thereto.

3. Attached hereto, designated as Exhibits "C" and
incorporated herein by this reference as though fully set forth is
a true and correct copy of Timothy Jafek's fax letter to me of
November 19, 2002, in which he advised, for the first time, that
the Trustee's "Document Depository" was now available for
inspection.  It is this Document Depository that contains the
Debtor's records, and without which any examination of the issue
of the operation of a ponzi scheme cannot begin.  On November 26,
2002, an initial inspection of the Document Depository was
scheduled.  The Court's attention is drawn to the Joint Status
Report herein where the Trustee has stated that the Debtor is not
available for deposition until after his scheduled sentencing
which is after the hearing date on the within Motion.

4. On December 3, 2002, at approximately 9:54 a.m., I
telephonically advised Alexander Pilmer that we would be lodging
the within application on December 4, 2002.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the
State of California and the United States of America that the
foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on this 3rd day of December, 2002, at Los Angeles,

                           [signed] [unintelligible]
                           Richard D. Burstein


                 KIRKLAND & ELLIS

                 Fax Transmittal
             777 South Figueroa Street
            Los Angeles, California 90017
               Phone: (213) 680-8400
                Fax: (213)680-8500

Please notify us immediately if any pages are not received


To:                             Company:                                     Fax #:        Direct #:
Alan F. Broidy                  Law Offices of Alan F. Broidy          310-286-6610     310-286-6601
Clifford C. Gramger, Jr.                                               505-983-4049     505-983-2246
Sean A. O'Keefe                 Winthrop Couchot, PC                   949-720-4111     949-720-4100
Daniel Kenny                    Harrington, Foxx, Dubrow, et al.       213-623-7929     213-489-3222
Gary J. Gorham                  Liner, Tankelevits, et al.             310-453-5901     310-453-5900
J. Clark Aristei                Baum, Hedland, Aristei, et al.         310-820-7444     310-207-3233
Howard Kollitz
Richard D. Burstein             Danning, Gill, Diamond, et al.         310-277-5735     310-277-0077
Richard Brownstein              Wasserman, Comden, et al.              818-996-8266     818-705-6800
Richard M. Moneymaker                                                  213-622-7002     213-622-1088
Richard S. Brewer, Jr.          McKenna, Long & Alderidge              619-595-5450     619-595-5400
Charles E. Campbell             McKenna, Long & Alderidge              404-427-4198     404-527-4000
Robert Marshall                 Sanger & Swysen                        805-963-7311     805-962-4887
Stephan Cochran                 Katteu, Muchin, Zavis, et al.          310-788-4471     310-788-4400
Ronald Gold                     Hewitt & Prout                         818-509-0402     818-509-0311
Scott B. Campbell               Rogers, Sheffield & Campbell           805-966-3715     818-963-9721

Sherman D. Lenske               Lenske, Lenske & Ambramson             818-883-9260     818-716-1444
Stephan G. Opperwall                                                   925-417-0301     925-417-0300
Herb Katz                       Kelly, Lytton & Vann                   310-277-5933     310-277-5333
Steven L Hogan                  Lurie, Zepeda, Schmalz, et al.         310-274-2798     310-274-8700
Walter A. Lack
Paul A. Traina                  Engstrom, Lipscomb & Lack              310-552-9434     310-552-3800
From:                           Date:                                        Fax #:        Direct #:
Mark T. Cramer                  November 11, 2002                      213-680-8500    (213)680-8412

                          EXHIBIT _A_


Burstein, Richard
From:                           Burstein, Richard
Sent:                           Monday, November 11, 2002 4:35 PM
To:                             alexander_pilmer@la.kirkland.com
Cc:                             Kollitz, Howard; Tung, Kim; James Devine: Shamo, Greg
Subject;                        RE: In re Reed Slatkin

You argue that the debtor's actual intent flows from running a ponzi scheme.  
His testimony is subject to dispute.  He could be lying because his testimony 
is bought and paid for.  If it is or is not a ponzi scheme can also be disputed 
by expert testimony, no matter what he says.  If it is not a ponzi scheme, than 
as to each transfer, you must show the requisite intent, which is of course a 
different level of effort.  I suggest that you will be in bad faith if you feel 
that on Slatkin's uncontested, untested say so you can resolve the issue.  I 
suggest you wait until the parties may take discovery.

-------Original Message---------
From: alexander_pilmer@la.kirkland.com [mailto: alexander_pilmer@la.kirkland.com]
Sent: Monday, November 11, 2002 4:05 PM
To: Burstein, Richard
Cc: Kollitz, Howard; Tung, Kim; James Devine; Shamo, Greg
Subject: Re: In re Reed Slatkin

Richard - we believe that the undisputed admissible
evidence will support our motion.  The bases for our
motion will be that the actual fraudulent transfer
claim for relief asks the question whether the
transferor (here Mr. Slatkin) had the actual intent to
defraud.  There can be no dispute that Mr. Slatkin had
an actual intent to defraud because he has already
plead guilty to such an offense.  We believe that none
of the discovery you seek can possibly lead to any
admissible evidence which will undercut that notion.
While I am not surprised to hear that you will oppose
our motion, I still would be happy to hear any
arguments you have that you believe you can find some
evidence that will support a contrary conclusion -
namely that Mr Slatkin did not have the actual intent
to defraud.


"Burstein, Richard" <RBurstein@dgdk.com)_ on 11/11/2002
03:29:27 PM

To: Alexander Pilmer/Los Angeles/Kirkland-Ellis@K&E
cc: "Kollitz, Howard" <HKollitz@dgdk.com>, "Tung,
     Kim" <KTung&Dgdk.com>, "James Devine"
     <Jdevine@dgdk.com>, "Shamo, Greg"

Subject: In re Reed Slatkin

Alex: I have your fax letter advising that on Monday, Nov 18, 2002, you
intend to serve a motion for partial summary judgment determining, based
on the "admissions" of the debtor, that he ran a ponzi scheme.  You
graciously note due date for our opposition.

Please be advised that we view this as an abuse of process.  You have
stated in court filings and in open court that the debtor is not
available for deposition until after sentencing in February.  You have
yet to give access t the debtor's records to evaluate the issue of a
ponzi scheme.  In open court you have agreed to continuances of states
conferences for several months to let discovery begin in light of these
obstacles.  Parties are entitled to a continuance of a motion for summary
judgment to conduct discovery.  How, under these circumstances, you can
justify bringing this motion now other than perhaps by the hope of
running up fees in this calendar year escapes me.  Any such motion that
you elect to bring under these circumstances will be resisted and
postponement sought for the reasons set forth herein and for all other
appropriate reasons. Please note in this regard that it is our strong
feeling that if you proceed in light of the above, that you violate Rule
11, FRBP 9001, and we will request that you withdraw such motion, or
failing that, that the court award sanctions against you and the trustee
for clearly abusive conduct.

Kindly advise of your intention.

Richard Burstein


                 KIRKLAND & ELLIS

             777 South Figueroa Street
            Los Angeles, California 90017
               Phone: (213) 680-8400
213 680-8500

                 November 19, 2002

By Facsimile and First Class Mail

Richard D. Burstein, Esq.
Danning, Gill, Diamond & Kollitz, LLP
2029 Century Park East, Third Floor
Los Angeles, CA 90067-2904

     Re: In re Reed Slatkin Case No. ND 01-11549-RR, Adversery Proceedings

Dear Richard:

     The Document Depoistory which contains documents related to Mr. Slatkin 
is now ready for your use. It will generally be available on weekdays from 9 a.m. 
to 5 p.m. You will have to arrange for access in advance because the Trustee must 
always have someone present in the Document Depository. 

     No copies of documents may be made on-site. Any copy requests must go through 
InHouse, a commercial copy service. You will be responsible for making copying 
arrangements; the Trustee will not have any part in those arrangements.

     The non-privildged documents index wil be available in the Document Depository.

     Please call to schedule access, or if you have any questions.


[signed Timothy Jafek]
Timothy B. Jafek

cc: R. Todd Neilson, Trustee



I, Howard Kolitz, declare as follows:

1. I am the principal of a professional corporation which is a partner in the law 
firm of Danning, Gill, Diamond & Kollitz, LLP ("DGD*K"), the attorney of record herein 
for Defendants, Peter Henman-Laufer and Milove Incorporated. The Facts set forth herein 
are true of my own personal knowledge. If called upon to testify thereto, I could and 
would competently do so.

2. On September 10, 2002, I sent a letter to Timothy B. Jafek of Kirkland & Ellis, counsel 
for the Plaintiff, R. Todd Neilson, as trustee ("Trustee") in the pending Chapter 11 
Bankruptcy Case for Reed E. Slatkin, as debtor ("the Debtor"), informing him that Defendants, 
Anthony and Margaret Hitchman ("the Hitchmans") intended to depose the Debtor in the 
adversary proceeding entitled, Neilson, etc., v. Hitchman, etc., et al., and designated 
number AD-02-01111-RR ("the Hitchman Lititgation"). I requested that Mr. Jafek advise me as 
to any dates which would be inconvenient for him during a sepcified three (3) week period. 
A true and correct copy of my September 10, 2002 letter to Mr. Jafek is attached hereto as 
Exhibit "1" and, by this reference, incorporated herein.

3. On September 13, 2002, I received a letter from R. Alexander Pilmer, another lawyer with 
Kirkland & Ellis, in response to my September 10, 2002 letter to Mr. Jafek. Mr. Pilmer advised 
that the trustee took the position that the Hitchmans were not entitled to take the Debtor's 
deposition. A true and correct copy of Mr. Pilmer's September 13, 2002 letter to me is 
attached hereto as Exhibit "2" and, by this reference, incorporated herein.

4. On September 13, 2002, I sent a letter to Mr. Pilmer in connection with arranging for a 
conference to discuss a deposition of the Debtor, pursuant to Rule 30(a)(2) of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, in the Hitchman Litigation. A true and correct copy of my September 
13, 2002 letter to Mr. Pilmer is attached hereto as Exhibit "3" and, by this reference, 
incorporated herein.

5. On September 19, 2002, Mr. Pilmer sent me an email proposing October 2, 2002 for the 
"meet and confer" regarding the HItchmans' disputed right to take the Debtor's deposition.

6. On September 23, 2002, I responded to Mr. Pilmer's September 19, 2002 email stating that, 
on October 2, 2002, we would meet and confer regarding, inter alia, the Hitchmans' deposition 
of the Debtor in the Hitchman Litigation. A true and correct copy of my September 23, 2002 
email to Mr. Pilmer and Mr. Pilmer's September 19, 2002 email to me are attached hereto as 
Exhibit "4" and, by this reference, incorporated herein.

7. On October 2, 2002, John R. Reitman, Andrew S. Rotter and Timothy B. Jafek (all lawyers 
representing the Trustee) and I, along with other lawyers of DGD&K, had a telephone conference 
to discuss, inter alia, taking the deposition of the Debtor in the Hitchman Litigation. During 
the course of our telephone conference, Mr. Reitman informed me that the Trustee's counsel was 
not prepared on October 2, 2002 to agree that the Hitchmans could seek to depose the Debto, 
and that the Trustee was not willing to produce any of the Debtor's documents until after the 
Trustee had copied all of those documents which task was then estimated to take another two 
(2) weeks.

8. Not until November 19, 2002, did the Trustee finally announce the availability of his 
Document Depository. I am informed that the Trustee currently takes the position that the Debtor 
will not be available for deposition until some unspecified date after he is sentenced in 
Feburary, 2003.

I declare, under penalty of perjury and subject to the laws of the United States of America, 
that the foregoing is true and correct to the best of my knowledge, information and belief.

Executed, on this 3rd day of December, 2002, at Los Angeles, California.


Howard Kollitz


September 10, 2002

Timothy B. Jafek, Esq.
Kirkland & Ellis
777 South Figueroa Street
Los Angeles, CA 90017

Re: Reed E. Slatkin Bankruptcy Case/Trustee adv. Hitchmans-A.P.
    No. Ad-02-01111-RR

Dear Tim:

Thank you for your September 5, 2002 letter, which my office received on September 9, 
2002. Please recall that, during our September 5, 2002 telephone conversation and in 
reponse to your description of the August 29, 2002 Order, I also advised you that the 
Hitchmans would move to both quash the writ of attachment and vacate the Temporary 
Protection Order obtained by the Trustee without notice. In that regard, you will be 
served with the Hitchmans' moving papers today.

On Septemeber 9, 2002 your firm delivered to this firm deposition notices, which 
include request for the production of documents, whereby the Trustee seeks to depose 
Anthony Hitchman in Los Anglees on September 20, 2002 and to depose Margaret Hitchman 
in Los Anglees on September 23, 2002. Neiter of the Hitchmans is available for deposition 
on September 20 or 23 in Los Angeles. Further, virtually all of the recoreds of the 
Hitchmans in connection with their transactions with Reed Slatkin are in transit to South 
Africa, and the Hitchmans will not have access to the those records until sometime during 
the next month, that is, during October of 2002. The Hitchmans will make themselves 
available in South Africa for depositions by video conference, or by telephone, or by 
written questions, without the production of documents on October 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 14, 15, 
16, 17, or 18, 2002, or, with the production of documents on November 18, 19, 20, 21, or 
22, 2002. The Trustee, in effect, is now forcing the Hitchmans to file a motion of vacate 
the September 6, 2002 Order, which was entered on the Trustee's ex parte application filed 
on Septemeber 5, 2002 and without any meaningful opportunity being afforded to the Hitchmans 
to respond. While the Trustee has, to date, elected to attempt to effect discovery by Orders 
obtained ex parte, or without any prior notice at all, I would ask that the Trustee 
reconsider, with a view to conducting this litigation on the most cost effect basis 
possible, his approach to discovery.

The Hitchmans are enttitled to depose Reed Slatkin. In that regard, please advise me as 
to those dates during the eweeks of September 30, October 7 and October 14, 2002 which 
would be inconvenient dates for you in connection with such deposition. 

Finally, please recall that, during our September 5, 2002 conversation, I advised you that 
the Hitchmans intend to file motion in the District Court to withdraw the reference of the 
Adversary Proceeding from the Bankruptcy Court, with a view to reducing litigation expense 
for both the Bankruptcy Estate and the Hitchmans. I inquired of you as to whether the 
Trustee would oppose such a motion, or would be willing to stipulate to the withdrawal of 
the reference. You advised me that you would consult with the Trustee and other lawyers 
working with you, and let me know what position the Trustee would take on this issue. 
Please advise me as to the Trustee's position on this issue at your eareliest possible 

Very truly yours,


Howard Kollitz

cc: John C. Reitman, Esq.
    Tony and Peggy Hitchman (w/encl.)
    RIchard D. Burstein, Esq.
    Kim Tung, Esq.
    Valerie Radocay (i/o)



Howard Kollitz
Danning, Gill, Diamond & Kollitz, LLP
2029 Century Park East
Third Floor
Los Angeles, California 90067

     Re: Neilson v. Hitchman

Dear Howard:

     This letter responds to your September 10, 2002 letter to Tim Jafek. In your letter to 
indicate that you would be serving us with a motion to quash the write of attachment on that 
day. We have not received any moving papers from you.

     We reject your proposals regarding the Hitchmans' depositions. They are under a court 
order to appear for their deposition, and produce documents, in my office. It is no concern 
of mine or my clients that the Hitchmans elected to flee the country. If the Hitchmans refuse 
to honor the Court order, we will take all appropriate actions to enforce it. Your request to 
take Mr. Slatkin's deposition is noted, however, the Hitchmans are not entitled to take that 
deposition. Finally, we do not agree at this time to stipulate to withdrawing the reference to 
the Bankruptcy court with respect to the action taken against the Hitchmans.

     Should you have any questions, please do not hestitate to contact me.



R. Alexander Pilmer


September 13, 2002


R. Alexander Pilmer, Esq.
Kirkland & Ellis
777 South Figueroa Street
Los Angeles, CA 90017

Re: Reed E. Slatkin Bankruptcy Case/Neilson, as Trustee, adv.
    Anthony Hitchman, Margaret Hitchman, et al. A.P. No.
    AD-02-01111-RR/Request Under Local Bankruptcy Rule 9013-

Dear Alex:

Please advise me as to when you would be availabel on September
25, 26, or 27, 2002 to meet and confer concerning the Hitchmans'
contemplated motion under Rule 30(a)(2) to obtain an Order of the
Court allowing the Hitchmans to depose Reed E. Slatkin. If the 
Trustee is willing to stipulate to the depostion being taken,
and save the time and expense assocaited with a dispute over this
matter, please advise me at your earliest convenience.

Very truly yours,



cc: Anthony and Peggy Hitchman 
    RIchard D. Burstein, Esq.
    Kim Tung, Esq.
    Greg Shamo, Esq.


James Devine ____________________________________

From :   Kollitz, Howard
Sent:    Wednesday, October 09, 2002 8:08 PM
To:      James Devine
Cc:      Servin, Vivian; Burstein, Richard; Kollitz, Howard, Tung, Kim; Shamo, Greg
Subject: RES-Hitchmans/#232237/ Slatkin Bankruptcy Case/Trustee adv Hitchmans


--- Original Message ---
From :   Kollitz, Howard
Sent:    Wednesday, September 23, 2002 3:05 PM
To:      'alexander_pilmer@la.kirkland.com'
Cc:      Kollitz, Howard; Burstein, Richard
Subject: RE: Slatkin Bankruptcy Case/Trustee adv Hitchmans

4 p.m. on 10-2-02 is acceptable for the meet and confer on the 
Hitchmans' contemplated motion to require Slatkin to appear for a 
deposition. We can proceed on the basis that the meet and confer on the 
contemplated motino is added to the agenda on teh conference call which Tim 
Jafek will initiate on 10-2-02.

--- Original Message ---
From:    'alexander_pilmer@la.kirkland.com'
Sent:    Thursday, September 19, 2002 3:59 PM
To:      hkollitz@dgdk.com

Since we keep missing each other by phone, I thought
I'd drop you a line. With respect to your request to
meet and confer regarding the Hitchmans' request to
depose Mr. Slatkin, I suggest that we schedule that
discussion for the same time as the rule 26(f)
The information contained in this communication is
confidential, may be attorney-client privileged, may
constitute inside information, and is intended only for
the use of the addressee. Is is the property of
Kirkland & Ellis. Unauthorized use, disclosure or
copying of this communication or any part thereof is
strictly prohibited and may be unlawful. If you have
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